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INTERIM WITHOUT END: NAMIBIA*S MORIBUND ECONOMY 
By Reginald Herbold Green
1984-1986: Bumping Along The Bottom
1In 1984 the Namibian economy’s rate of decline slowed to 1%. Preliminary
2indications are that 1985 figures will show little change. The optimistic
projections for 1986 are for 2% growth^ and the pessimistic for a similar
decline. With population growing perhaps 3% a year this implies a three year
fall in output per capita of the order of '\0% over the three years and over
430% for the past decade.
The inevitable result remains increasing poverty and unemployment. Given the 
very unequal income distribution in Namibia along racial lines and the
deliberate creation of a black middle class for political purposes, the
majority of Namibians are up to 50% poorer than they were a decade ago and 
over two thirds are below the absolute poverty line. Like the growth (or more 
accurately contraction) rate of output, these are among the worst figures for
5Sub-Saharan Africa.
While Namibia’s economic structure centred on minerals, fish and cattle was 
ill positioned to face post 1975 metal prices declines, the collapse of fish 
stocks (a self-made wound from overfishing and drought), the basic cause for 
the objectively miserable economic performance lies at the political level.
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South Africa's political and political economic end game in Namibia precludes 
genuine independence. It requires sustaining white incomes and those of a 
black middle class as well as elaborate 'homeland' and pseudo internal 
governmental apparatuses as well as of a full scale war. As a result despite 
high territorial tax rates, Namibia has bcome a severe drain on the South
African treasury and the present situation is viewed as inherently unstable by 
almost everyone, no matter what ultimate outcome they would prefer. The
so-called 'transitional government' is not taken very seriously by anyone - 
perhaps as little by white Namibian businessmen as by black Namibian workers 
and peasants and shows no sign of having any coherent economic ideas.
The denunciations of De Beers for overmining and underdeclaring profits 
reached a crescendo with the 1986 publication of the Thirion Report.^1 In one 
sense they were a welcome relief for the Administration (which has no great 
love for Anglo-De Beers either in Namibia or at home in South Africa) by 
concentrating attention elsewhere. However, as they also highlighted the 
total ineptitude of the mineral and financial officials in respect to CDM and 
were followed by a weak and badly drafted set of mining law proposals, they
only added to the lack of faith in official economic policy and performance.
7While a growing body of SWAPO oriented economic analysis continues to appear, 
its immediate impact is not on the Namibia economy. Rather it increases the 
evidence that political economic alternatives and room for manoeuvre would 
exist for Namibia at independence, adds to the credibility of SWAPO's own 
political economic statements and is contributing to a SWAPO process of 
preparing its personnel and institutional structures for the day when they can 
shift from waging a liberation war to rebuilding an economy and society.
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Meanwhile South Africa has continued to build structures for economic (as well
O
as political and military) destabilisation of Namibia after independence .
These range from the creation of the high cost black elite through transfer
(to Namibia) of the loss making railway system and the older transfer (from
Namibia) of Walvis Bay to localising - at least and at most in name and
partial cost recovery - of the South African forces in Namibia. In parallel a
much more sophisticated operation has been launched to "deglamourise" SWAPO
oand its growing cadre of Christian and internal Namibian Party allies. 
Diamonds: All That Glitters Is Not Transparent
In 1985 De Beers campaign to regain control over the balance of supply and
demand in the diamond market began to notch up steady victories. Prices were
raised by the Central Selling Organisation, the secondary market pipeline
began to empty, De Beers was able to reduce the large stocks it had held back
to reduce pressure on the market. Between December 1985 and March 1 986 the
Financial Times changed its view from "Market Slump Brings Trouble for De
10Beers" to "De Beers’ prospects are sparkling again".
De Beers 19 8 5 Annual Report "shows production at CDM declined marginally from 
9 3 0 , 1 8 3  carats in 1984 to 9 0 9 , 5 3 0  in 1 985 - a level not likely to be exceeded 
greatly in 19 8 6 . More interestingly they show a leap in "South West 
Africa/Namibia" profit share from 8Í in 1984 to 13 % in 1985 or slightly over 
R100 million. Assuming all or virtually all profits were distributed this 
suggests a value of sales of the order of R325 to 350 million with mining 
taxes of the order of R 1 5 0 million.
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Prospecting and evaluation drilling in gravel along the north bank of the
Orange River - where Diamond Area No. 1 seems to have been quietly extended
inland - continued and are now in their fifth year suggesting that additional
reserves have been found but that CDM is in no hurry to bring them onstream.
Near Elizabeth Bay areas mined in the 1920s and 1930s are being
1 1re-investigated while off-shore and interior prospecting continues.
Mining continued to advance out to sea behind sea walls and overburden
stripping remained ahead of mining. The average carats per 100 tons of
conglomerate treated fell from 12.32 in 1984 to 11.12 in 1985; largely offset
12by a rise in tonnage treated.
The last point is of special interest in light of the Thirion Commission of 
13Inquiry's eight volume report which inter alia accused CDM of "overmining" 
both in the sense of mining too heavily and of concentrating on the richest 
areas and thus by-passing and rendering unviable adjacent lower quality 
conglomerates. De Beers' contention is that mining plans have regularly been 
adjusted to diamond market demand conditions (in general, and for the large 
high quality stones of which CDM is the world's premier producer) and that the 
quality of conglomerate used is raised in poor years and lowered in good to 
reduce volatility of profits.
Mr. Justice Thirion's Report - which has not been publically released - is 
hard to evaluate. It appears to have resiled somewhat from claims of 50$ 
undervaluation of sales and to assert: that CDM is paid only 80% of the London 
"sight price" - with 10$ commissions to two constituents of the Central 
Selling Organisation, one in South Africa and one in London; that costs have
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been overstated to reduce tax liability and that tax is paid only when 
diamonds are sold and not when they are exported to be held in stock. 20$ if * 
accurate is a high level of charges; if CDM retains title to the diamonds tax 
would - under most diamond mining legislation - not be payable until they were 
sold.
The most serious charges were based on testimony by ex-CDM technical assistant 
Gordon Brown. He asserted that overmining - in quantity and in quality 
stripping - was begun in the 1970s to mine out by 1990 - ahead of
independence. This is not entirely borne out by reported production levels 
which have historically swung sharply around 1,500,000 carats over the past 20 
odd years with the highest production in the mid-1960s, matched in 1980 at 
around 2,000,000 carats but now cut back below 1,000,000 for the first time in 
over a quarter century. Nor are the claims as to quality of reserves mined 
clear-cut. Evidence does exist of internal disagreement on attention clean-up 
and bed rock sweeping and residual pockets of conglomerate. However there is 
some reason to suppose that by 1984 so-called vacuum cleaner techniques and 
equipment had been secured for dealing with them.
On the technical issues De Beers asserted that Mr. Justice Thirion was unable 
to understand the technical evidence and at least implied that Brown was 
engaged in a vendetta against his former employer. As De Beers declined to 
testify in public claiming commercial confidentiality and Justice Thirion 
refused to hear them in closed sessions, the technical issues remain 
unresolved with broadsides from both Thirion and De Beers providing sound, 
fury and smoke but little transparency.
On the total ineffectiveness of Namibia's mining monitoring and tax collection
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machinery, the Report is on much firmer ground. Overseeing appears in 
practice to have amounted to overlooking. De Beers statements were accepted 
at face value as were bare statements of tax paid (by all mining companies, 
not just CDM) with no supporting details or documentation from the Pretoria 
tax office. The mining legislation remained virtually as it had been in the 
1920s - including an odd arrangement through which CDM pays royalties to
itself as the legal successor to the Imperial German mineral rights!
He also noted defects in prospecting rights resulting in "landlocking" of
large areas which mining companies could withhold from other developers 
without engaging in substantial prospecting nor incurring large fees. A 
particularly contentious case turns on limestone deposits apparently 
"landlocked" by a major South African cement producer for a decade.
From this welter of claims and uncertainties several facts emerge:
1. Oranjemund has always been De Beers 'swing' mine with large output 
variations used to adjust group production levels toward global demand;
2. While destabilising annual output and revenue in Namibia, this strategy 
does not necessarily conflict Namibia's economic interests in the long
term because it tends to result in high production in years of strong and
low in years of weak prices;
3 . CDM mining strategy does not appear likely to leave large unworkable low 
grade deposits at least not unless prices remain depressed resulting in 
continued exploitation of an above average reserve quality set of 
deposits and certainly seems to foresee production at least on the
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present scale into the next century with distinct implications of 
additional substantial, partially proven upstream reserves;
4. But there has been no effective state monitoring of CDM's operations - 
much less requirements for approval of mining plans (as in Botswana or 
Tanzania) so that any conflict of territorial and corporate interest has 
inevitably been resolved in favour of the latter;
5. Similarly with no independent check on valuation (as there is in Botswana 
and Tanzania) it is impossible to say whether CDM's stones have been 
bought at full value even though the wilder claims of up to 50% 
undervaluation appear to be based on misleading calculations; and
6. The entire legislative and official monitoring framework of Namibia 
(especially but not only for diamonds) is archaic and staffed to a 
substantial extent by personnel from the mining companies it is supposed 
to regulate.
The "transitional government" announced the report and allowed reporting of
14some of its findings. Indeed its public relations sheet - Namibia Now 
reported its findings albeit in a low key. However it was not published in 
full - apparently because the "cabinet" feared alienating the major mining 
companies.
A mining committee was set up to study the Thirion Report and draft a paper on 
mining policy, prospecting, sale of minerals and implementation of
legislation.^ Somewhat implausibly the Secretary for Economic Affairs, Piet 
Kruger - the official responsible for monitoring the industry and therefore a
main target of Justice Thirion's criticisms - was named chairman.
Even long standing settler business enemies of De Beers such as Eric Lang
16exploded in wrath. He not only refused to make submissions to the committee
but suggested Kruger's dismissal as a good first step. The Chairman of the
Chamber of Commerce, Peter Meinert, suggesting calling in and reviewing all
17mining tax returns retrospectively. Local miners and prospectors called for
involvement of the private sector - an outcry to which Mining "Minister"
1 fiAndreas Shipanga quickly responded.
Rossing: Profits, Public Relations and Problems
In 1985 Rossing's output probably fell to 3,500 to 4,000 tonnes of
19yellowcake but pre-tax profits were firm at around $ 160 million of which $41
million went to RTZ (including its Rio Algam subsidiary), $ 3 9 million to other
20shareholders and up to $80 million to taxes. This implies a total revenue
on the order of $250 million (R550 million at late 19 8 5 exchange rates) or $28
to 32 per pound versus spot prices in the $17.50 to $20.00 range. Local
21expenditure - including taxation was put at R350 million which together with 
shareholder after tax profits comes to R525 million odd suggesting relatively 
low capital expenditure on imported plant and equipment.
22Rossing's shareholding position has always been obscure. RTZ (including Rio 
Algam) holds 51$ of the equity, the industrial development Corporation of
South Africa and General Mining Corporation (also of South Africa) 20$, total
of France and perhaps Urangellschaft of Germany 10$ to 15$, leaving 14$ to 1 9$ 
unidentified. Voting rights have been known not to correspond to holdings of
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shares with RTZ resolutely denying it held majority control and the IDC 
implying at least that it did. Apparently there is a ’master share' with 
approximately 50* of the voting power though no special rights as to 
dividends.
This share has been transferred to the ’transitional government' as part of
the creation of a facade ’Namibianisation' of South African parastatal
23ventures in Namibia. J In the case of the railways the transfer has also 
ended South African responsibility for covering heavy losses and in that of 
SWAWEK (South West African Water and Electricity Corporation) presumptively 
transfers (or purports to transfer) liabilities for borrowings made by ESCOM 
(Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa) to build inter alia, Ruacana 
Falls Dam and the transmission line from the Cape. Rossing is a profitable 
asset (as potentially are the offshore gas and oil prospecting rights held by 
the First National Development Corporation) but the transfer is apparently of 
a mere 3 .5 % of the equity (from IDC) even though this carries over half 
(probably 53-5%) of the voting rights.
24The fitful pressure against purchasers and processors of Namibian uranium 
oxide was stepped up in 1 9 8 5-8 6 . The UN Council for Namibia acting under its 
1974 Decree No. 1 on natural resource use moved to sue the Dutch based and 
UK-Federal Germany-Dutch owned Urenco processing consortium. It is known that 
Urenco's Almelo plant is a major (though probably by no means the only) 
processor of low concentration uranium made from Rossing yellowcake. While 
Urenco's claim that it cannot chemically identify sources (which are often 
mixed) of consignments for processing, the yellowcake purchase patterns of 
some users make clear the provenance of at least part of their shipment to 
Almelo which has chosen neither to check on sources nor to require
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certification that Namibian uranium oxide was not one of them. The chances
for a successful suit - both in terms of a decision and of impact on
Netherlands and EEC decision takers are viewed as relatively favourable and - 
legally at least - unaffected by the probable appearance of the 'transitional 
government1 (which has no international legal standing) on behalf of the
defendants.
Mining; Prospects and Perplexities
The 1 9 8 5 - 8 6 collapse of the rand has been a blessing for Namibia's export 
directed mining sector. Rand revenues have risen faster than rand costs. It 
seems likely that Tsumeb in 19 8 5 returned to a clear operating profit position 
albeit its heavy interest costs from the takeover of Otjihase and
rehabilitation of Tsumeb processing facilities may well have left its pre-tax 
bottom line in or near the red.
On the other hand only for diamonds has there been a clear market recovery 
(and even there least for CDM's large, high quality stones). Uranium remains 
in the doldrums while copper has - in constant price terms - drifted to its 
lowest levels in 40 years with lead and zinc prices holding up only in 
comparison with copper. The collapse of the International tin agreement and 
the resultant free fall in tin prices has created major problems for Uis, 
Namibia's main tin producer.
Meanwhile, apart from uranium and diamonds, the sector faces an ever 
shortening and narrowing future. Low metal prices and uncertainty have halted 
opening of substantial new mines for nearly a decade and led to severe
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cutbacks on development and - except for Anglo American - prospecting. As 
most Namibian hard rock mineral deposits are small (Tsumeb was the major 
exception but is nearing exhaustion), unless major mine openings take place 
within five to seven years a rapid decline in output will mark the early 
1990s.
25Sanctions - both in respect to imports and to the implmentation of the 
Councils Decree No. 1 - increasingly concerned mining companies during
1985-86. They were also disturbed by the damage the Thirion Report did to the 
industry's image and responded both by challenging its professional conference 
and by offering to cooperate with the inter-departmental review committee.
Unions: Moves and Countermoves
In 1 9 8 5 workers at both Rossing and CDM took initial steps toward affiliating 
with South Africa's National Union of Mineworkers (a pillar of COSATU the main 
non-racial, anti-apartheid trade union federation). CDM - consistent with 
Anglo/De Beers group policy - officially welcomed the move. Rossing - in line 
with its own and RTZ's anti-union policy - did not.
The potential re-emergence of open militant trade unionism, five years after 
the breaking of the National Union of Namibian Workers as an open organising 
and negotiating body, alarmed the 'transitional government?' A Wage and 
Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act was rushed through the appointed 
'National Assembly' to ban non-residents from holding office in Namibian 
unions, providing assistance in their formation, on addressing Namibian 
workers. The NUM commented that "It appears to NUM that the present interim
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government is going the route of all the so-called homelands in South Africa 
by banning trade unions from operating in the territory.
Ironically the Act clearly conflicted with the 'transitional governments' own 
"bill of rights" basic policy document. For this reason - and because of 
doubts as to its legality - Administrator General Louis Piennar returned it to
pOthe 'cabinet' for reconsideration and amendment.
In April 1 986 a new trade union did appear on the scene at Rossing. The
placatory noises made by the mangement, the lack of negative reaction by the
'transitional government' and the appointment of a conservative, senior
Afrikaaner employee as General Secretary (to whom the black chairman referred
29all questions) cast serious doubts on its genuineness.
Meanwhile 4,000 nurses (60—65% of the total) were seeking to organise a new 
union of their own. They view the existing Nurses Association to be both 
white and government dominated. The immediate response of the authorities was 
to indicate they would not welcome (i.e. register) a "political^ union".
The Namibian National Trade Union - a body recognising the UN Council as the
legal authority in Namibia - was launched early in 1 9 8 6. Its first affiliate,
The Wholesale and Retail Workers Union, was established in April. Whether
NNTU will in fact achieve registration and/or be allowed to operate is
R1unclear. Certainly it would appear to be a distinctly political union.
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Gross Domestic Product; Continued Unsuccess
In terms of the past decade 1984 and 1985 were good years for the Namibian 
economy. In 1984 current price GDP rose to R1952 ($792) million. In real
terms that represented a decline of 0.9% compared to 1983s 4.3$.^2 In 1985
real output is said to have risen 0.2%. As the business community views it, 
"faint signs of an economic recovery". However, if 1986 growth is 2% (the 
optimistic view) this will still mean that in only one of the past 10 years 
has it risen as rapidly as population - a record virtually unmatched even in 
depression ridden sub-Saharan Africa and contrasting markedly with the rapid 
growth (on the order of 4$ a year in real per capita terms) of neighbouring 
Botswana whose economy is also mineral and ranching based.
On closer examination the 1984 figures look rather worse than the total might
suggest. Agriculture, fishing, mining, construction, manufacturing and
government were down while water and electricity were stagnant. Only
commerce, transportation, communications, finance, real estate, personal
services and miscellaneous showed gains. Indeed commerce’s gain of over 17%
33was the only major improvement on the 19 8 3 performance.
Mining net operating surplus for 1 9 8 5 was said to be R279 million (versus a
341980 peak of R457 million) and taxable profit R247 million. These figures 
would appear to imply sales of the order of R 1,000 million and value added in 
the sector of the order of R700-750 million. Given the falling value of the 
rand this apparent leap from 1984's R510 million sectoral value added is 
plausible even given stagnant output and generally weak world prices. Such an 
increase is also supported by the swing from a 1984 visible external trade
deficit of R72 to a 1 98 5 surplus of R342 million.
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The rise in poverty has been steady over 1977-1986, paralleling the decline in 
the economy. Absolute poverty estimates - even for the economically active 
(including unemployed but excluding crippled and retired) rose from 5 7 $ in
1977 to 66.5? by 1 98 5 - all very high proportions even in sub-Saharan African 
terms. Adjusted for crippled and retired persons the 19 8 5 figure would 
probably exceed 70/6.^
This poverty is at one level "Deliberately created poverty" - as set out in 
Oxfam's 1986 study Namibia; A Violation of Trust. ^  Even today Namibia's
average output per person is above that of any independent African state in 
the region except Botswana and over twice that of Tanzania where the 
absolutely poor proportion is probably about 5 0 %. At another, however, its 
increase relates to the failure of the economy to grow. Formal employment has 
fallen over the past decade with increasing numbers of people driven into
sub-subsistence small scale agriculture, informal (e.g. petty trading, 
handicraft, bar girls) sector work and unemployment. Recently financial
stringency has led several ethnic authorities to suspend even the pittance 
pensions and old age allowances they formerly paid.
The Council of Churches of Namibia and several of its members have inaugurated 
or stepped up food aid programmes both in Katatura (Windhoek's African 
"location") and in particularly impoverished rural areas such as the Kaokoveld 
and the war dislocated North. This food aid has concentrated on schools and
children and to date remains largely at crisis management level with little
time or resources to develop self help, rehabilitation schemes. NNC hopes - 
with growing external financial support - to shift its programmes in that 
direction. Like the Christian organisation food aid distribution itself, this
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is most unwelcome to the occupation regime which has branded it "SWAPO Aid",
oilthreatened reprisals against recipients and hampered delivery.
OQ
Budget Balancing: Double Entries and Doubletalk
New loan revenue in 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 rose to R1078.9 million on the central territorial 
budget. Of this R7 4 3 . 8  million was own revenue (including a R300 million 
South African payment in lieu of customs and excise, up from R250 million in 
1984/85). Loans raised apparently totalled R85 million - including atypically 
R28 million from a Namibian commercial bank - bringing total funds raised to 
R 1,164 million. As the 'surplus’ carried forward was up to R 136 million from 
under R100 million this implies actual expenditure of about R 1,125 million 
versus R 1,392 million budgeted.
The 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 budget as presented to the 'National Assembly' by 'Finance 
Minister' Dirk Mudge came to R 1,545.3 million with no borrowing planned. 
Revenue was estimated at R 1,405.2 million with the 'surplus' carried forward 
bridging the gap.
Own revenues were expected to rise 26% to 938.2 million (including an increase 
of R50 million to R350 million of 'customs and excise' payment). South 
African transfers were budgeted at R466.9 million, a 34$ increase over 
19 8 5/8 6 's R335 million, apparently largely related to gradual transfer of a 
rising proportion of police and military expenditure in Namibia to the 
territorial budget.
The new Budget taken together with a 20$ inflation rate suggests a real
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decline at estimates level of the order of 10%. If compared to 1 9 8 5 / 8 6  
actuals, however, it would leave room for an increase of over 11$. Given the 
tendency to underspend and the apparent shifting of some ’security' items from 
RSA to SWA account, the former may be the more accurate estimate.
The budget was - somewhat surprisingly - denounced as discriminatory and 
preserving the status quo by the senior economic analyst of the 'transitional
■3Qgovernment's' public relations consultants. The data itself, e.g. showing 
R1,165 spent on each white pupil's education versus R317 per Ovambo pupil's, 
is hardly novel; its source is and points up the curious contradictions of
this pseudo populist puppet regime.
Livestock, Fisheries - and Locusts
With the breaking of the long drought in 1984/85 agriculture probably showed
some recovery in 19 8 5 from its 1984 level of 44 $ of 1 9 7 6 's peak output. The
karakul industry in particular recorded increased output - probably about
1 ,200,000 pelts or 40$ of late 1970s level. In 1985 this proved a mixed
blessing as the increased output combined with weak demand put severe pressure 
40on prices. In 1 986 these recovered somewhat and were also boosted so far as
growers were concerned by the continuing fall in the rand. In July the
average price per pelt was R31 (up from R22.4 in February) a record in rand
terms but still hovering between £8 and £9 well below late 1970s levels of up 
41to £15.
The South West African Karakul Authority (Swakara) has renewed efforts to 
strengthen demand for karakul by bringing it back into style. To this end it
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has launched ventures with two major German fur traders (Rosenberg and Lenhart
and Thorer) and a Hong Kong concern (Broadway Furs). Exhibitions in 1 986
hoincluded Japan, Hong Kong, Milan, Madrid, Paris and New York.
Recovery of the cattle sector - stricken by drought losses including forced 
sales and also by low prices - was slower. It remains to be seen whether, 
given present uncertainties, even remaining ranchers will invest in the 
expensive, multi-year process of restocking.
Fishing industry profits rose in 19 8 5 and 1986 - partly at least because of
the increased rand value of exports. Both Seaswas and Oceana reported 40 to
60% increases in turnover and more than doubled profits for the October 1985 -
4RMarch 19 86 half year.
However, the volume of fish caught showed little if any recovery, partly - but 
not wholly - as a result of quota control. In the case of sardines - whose 
41,000 ton quota was caught in six weeks - the total biomass (schools) 
remained below 200,000 tonnes. This was, however, higher than previous 
estimates and the unbalanced age structure of catches (with a 
disproportionately large number of immature and young) also showed some signs 
of correction.
To the locust-like plague of predatory fishing, 1986’s rains added a new 
plague of brown locusts. These appear to have swarmed from the Kalahari (and 
are severely affecting Botswana as well) with the return of damp soils. Their 
threat to pasture may be limited but their impact on crop production - and 
therefore staple peasant food supply in the north - is likely to be very 
severe.
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Post Independence Destabilisation: Gambit and Reply
South Africa remains uncertain as to the means and timing of withdrawal from
Namibia. However, it has clearly indicated its intention to retain military,
political and economic leverage after independence. At least seven key levers
have been created which South Africa could use in "destructive engagement" 
44against Namibia.
The first is the so-called external debt raised by the Administrator General 
and stated by Finance Secretary Johan Jones in 1985 to have reached R600 
million (a surprisingly low and possibly understated figure given previous 
totals of as much as R500 million by the end of 1983). To repudiate it - 
despite the authority of the International Court of Justices 1971 opinion that 
RSA had no power to raise loans on behalf of Namibia and the 1983 Vienna 
Convention on "Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and 
Debts" - could cause international financial image problems for Namibia, to 
service it would be crippling.
The second is the budgetary shambles both in terms of the large 
revenue/expenditure gap and of the appearance (carefully cultivated by South 
Africa that Namibia is a permanent fiscal "basket case".
Third, the administrative structure of occupied Namibia is an expensive, 
inefficient multi-tiered monstrosity. Its reform will take time, funds and 
firing of substantial numbers of Namibians. Further key posts are held by 
South Africans whose withdrawal could cause near paralysis.
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Fourth, a black elite has been created in public sector and large company 
employment. While not politically pro-South African their attainment of 
R5,000-12,500 annual incomes - which cannot possibly be generalised to 
Namibian workers in general in the foreseeable future - will pose massive 
fiscal problems if maintained and social and political if cut.
Fifth, Walvis Bay has been 'returned' to the Cape Province so that at 
independence Namibia's access to the sea is likely to be through a remaining 
South African occupied enclave. Combined with the sixth factor, the railway 
system's dependence on South African maintenance facilities and personnel (and 
to a degree rolling stock) this gives a potential stranglehold on transport.
Seventh, Oranjemund - Namibia's premier economic asset - lies within mortar 
range of the South African side of the Orange River while the off-shore Kudu 
gas field, when and if developed, would be totally vulnerable to South African
naval or marine commando attacks.
As South Africa's record of regional destabilisation indicates, it would be 
naive to suppose it does not intend to use these instruments. The question 
confronting an independent Namibia will be how to limit or dismantle them.
Recent studies suggest that the potential for dismantling - e.g. tax and
administrative reform, activation of alternative port facilities, a wages and 
incomes policy and a clear affirmation of the non-validity of the 'debt'
(almost all held by RSA financial institutions) is greater than has been
lit;supposed. However, such contingency planning and pre-emptive action will 
place a heavy burden (in terms of key personnel time as well as of funds) on
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independent Namibia.
Looking Ahead
Occupied Namibia has no economic future because it has no political or social
future. With no investor confidence, low profits, no coherent South African
or 'transitional government' economic strategy and no funds to implement one
46neither recovery nor structural adjustment is possible.
The right wing settler business community's quasi populist/quasi libertarian 
47strategy - tax the big companies, cut the budget, get South Africa off our
backs has no objective reality because it has no conceivable political base.
48The gradualism of writers like Wolfgang Thomas - and a portion of the local 
business community - might have had a future in 1976 (especially if the major 
multi-nationals had then favoured it) but in 1986 is an idea whose time has 
passed. Change - as in Zimbabwe - may well be phased and involve the private 
enterprise sector and a significant number of ex-settlers, but - also as in 
Zimbabwe - it will be much more basic than putting touches of black paint on 
the political economy of the occupation regime now and increasing access to 
the elite tomorrow, which is what such transition to "acceptable" capitalist 
development in Namibia would mean.
SWAPO's political economic strategy remains - probably deliberately - at the 
levels of broad themes, personnel development and amassing of information. 
Its intense involvement in the final conference/workshop leading up to 
Perspectives for Namibian Reconstruction and Development*^ (over half of its 
Secretaries as well as other senior officials took part) represents a stepping
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up of its programme of creating a planning and policy capacity for 
independence. However, that capacity cannot be deployed - other than in 
updating its information, augmenting its training and refining its policy 
portfolio - until independence. That remains as unclear as ever and 
increasingly captive to South African internal political considerations and 
great power geo-political concerns over which Namibians have little influence. 
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